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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:




In 1997, Child Protective Services ("CPS") received over three
million reports of child abuse nationwide.' This statistic reflects
the unfortunate reality that child abuse is a prevalent and pervasive
problem.2 A troubling issue that arises when investigating sus-
pected cases of child abuse is under what circumstances a state ac-
tor may enter a child's home and conduct a strip search of the
child's body for physical evidence of abuse. The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, has never addressed this issue. Due to the recent
rise in reports of child abuse,3 there exists a heightened need to
examine the constitutionality of these searches and develop a uni-
form rule according to which these searches should be conducted.
In light of the unique nature of children and the substantially
intrusive nature of a strip search, a nude search of a child's body
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1997. I would like to thank my family and friends for their support. I
would especially like to thank Jodi Horowitz for encouraging me to persevere with
this piece.
1. See NATIONAL COMM. TO PREVENT CHILD ABUSE, CHILD ABUSE AND NE-
GLECT STATISTICS (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter "NATIONAL COMMITTEE REPORT"].
2. See id. In 1997, CPS confirmed 1,045,000 reports of child maltreatment. See
id. This statistic represents 15 out of every 1000 children in the United States. See id.
The 1997 survey revealed that 22% of the confirmed cases were physical abuse, 8%
were sexual abuse, 54% were neglect, 4% were emotional maltreatment and 12%
were other forms of maltreatment. See id. In 1996, CPS agencies confirmed that 1185
children died as a result of abuse and neglect. See David A. Berger, Proposed
Changes to Rules for Courts-Martial 804, 914A and Military Rule of Evidence
611(d)(2): A Partial Step Towards Compliance With the Child Victims' and Child Wit-
nesses' Rights Statute, ARMY LAW. 19 n.1 (1999) (citing C.T. Wang & D. Daro, Cur-
rent Trends in Child Abuse Reporting & Fatalities: The Results of the 1997 Annual
Fifty State Survey, Chicago, IL: National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse (1998)).
Each day more than three children die as a result of abuse or neglect. See id. Forty-
four percent of these children die as a result of neglect, 51% as a result of abuse and
5% as a result of both abuse and neglect. See id.
3. The number of reported child abuse and neglect cases confirmed by CPS in
1997 represents a 1.7% increase from the 1996 statistics. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 1. Between 1988 and 1997, child abuse reporting levels increased
41%. See id. Since 1985, the rate of child abuse fatalities has increased by 34%. See
Berger, supra note 2.
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within his home for signs of abuse clearly raises Fourth Amend-
ment concerns. In Darryl H. v. Coler,4 the Seventh Circuit stated
that "it does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a
nude search of a ... child is an invasion of the constitutional rights
of some magnitude."5 Furthermore, "a man's home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy."' 6 Thus, to conduct a
valid strip search inside a home, the State officer must comply with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the context of
child abuse investigations, the warrantless search of a child for evi-
dence of abuse is per se unreasonable and violates the Fourth
Amendment unless the search falls within one of two well-deline-
ated exceptions: where consent has been given 7 or where exigent
circumstances exist.8
This Note proposes a uniform standard according to which strip
searches in child abuse investigations should be conducted. Part I
discusses the evolution of children's rights and identifies the inter-
ests of the child and the parents in child abuse investigations. This
part also explores the process of weighing the interests of the child
and the parents against the interests of the State to determine the
reasonableness of a strip search in child abuse investigations. Part
II analyzes the two possible exceptions under which a State actor
may conduct a warrantless search of a child's nude body during a
child abuse investigation: consent and exigent circumstances. In
addition, it examines the availability of the qualified immunity de-
fense in child abuse investigations with respect to social workers
and police officers. In Part III, this Note argues that a child should
possess the authority to consent to a strip search of his or her body
during a child abuse investigation. Furthermore, this Note suggests
that the evidentiary standard for the exigent circumstances excep-
4. 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that visual inspections by state social
workers of unclothed children for evidence of child abuse are searches under the
Fourth Amendment).
5. Id. at 900 (citing Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980)). In Ren-
frow, the Seventh Circuit added that a nude search of a child "is a violation of any
known principle of human decency." 631 F.2d at 92.
6. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (holding that electronic and
physical intrusions into an enclosed telephone booth are searches under the Fourth
Amendment and are presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant).
7. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (concluding that to
justify a noncustodial search of a subject on the basis of consent the state must
demonstrate that the consent was voluntarily given).
8. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit police officers from making warrantless entries and




tion to the Fourth Amendment should be lowered from probable
cause to reasonable suspicion. Additionally, this Note proposes
the creation of a rebuttable presumption that the defense of quali-
fied immunity in child abuse investigations is available to social
workers but not to police officers. This Note concludes that by re-
laxing the current standards governing strip searches in child abuse
investigations and affording children a voice in these situations, the
law will adequately safeguard the health and well-being of abused
children.
I. IDENTIFYING AND WEIGHING THE INTERESTS OF THE CHILD,
THE PARENTS AND THE STATE IN CHILD
ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS
A. Evolution of Children's Rights
Traditionally, children were not afforded any rights of their
own.9 Instead, they were treated as chattel controlled by their par-
ents and the State. 10 In Meyer v. Nebraska" and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,'2 the Supreme Court held that the State may not inter-
fere with parents' rights to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. In doing so, the Court established the
fundamental constitutional right of family autonomy.13 Not sur-
prisingly, however, the Court in both Meyer and Pierce weighed
only the interests and rights of the parents against that of the State.
The child was therefore left without a voice to speak on behalf of
his own "best interest. 14
9. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the right to
marry, establish a home and rear one's children as one deems fit are among one's
basic civil rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (concluding that parents' rights to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control is fundamental); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a parent has a fundamental constitutional right in di-
recting the upbringing and education of her child).
10. See, e.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390. See also Curtis C.
Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A. J. 719, 720 (1962)
("The basic right of a juvenile is not to liberty but to custody. He has the right to have
someone take care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this custodial privilege,
the law must do so.").
11. 262 U.S. at 390.
12. 268 U.S. at 510.
13. See id.; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
14. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510.
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1. Rights of Children
In 1967, the Supreme Court's groundbreaking decision in In re
Gault5 transformed the way in which the legal system treated chil-
dren.16 The Court concluded that minors have constitutional rights
independent from the family. 17 Justice Fortas articulated that
"whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."' 8 Never
before had the Court afforded children a voice in issues concerning
themselves. Gault served as a "wellspring for the development of
the constitutional rights of minors." 19
In 1969, Justice Fortas again spoke for the Court in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,20 reaffirming its
earlier holding that children have rights separate from their par-
ents.2' The Court held that the First Amendment protected the
wearing of armbands in school by students and teachers to express
certain views,22 explaining that this constitutional protection ex-
tends to children as well as adults.2 3 The Court further held that, in
this instance, the children's First Amendment rights trumped the
State's interests. 24 Justice Fortas emphasized that neither students
nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 25
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments protected a 15-year-old boy accused in juvenile court of a charge that
threatened years of imprisonment).
16. See id. In In re Winship, the Supreme Court held that "the constitutional safe-
guard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudica-
tory stage of delinquency proceedings as are those constitutional safeguards applied
in Gault." 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). In Breed v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that
the protections of the double jeopardy clause applied to juveniles. See 421 U.S. 519
(1975).
17. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 58.
18. Id.
19. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 135 (3d ed. 1995).
20. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
21. See id. at 513.
22. See id.
23. See id. ("First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics





2. Restrictions on Children's Rights
In Bellotti v. Baird,26 the Court departed substantially from its
continuing trend toward recognizing children's rights.27 In Bellotti,
the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute regulating minors'
access to abortions.28 In doing so, it acknowledged that children
have rights separate from adults but that these rights are not equal
to those of adults.2 9 The Court articulated three reasons to justify
this conclusion: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inabil-
ity to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and
the importance of the parental role in child rearing. '"30 Although
the Court stated that a child's right with respect to many constitu-
tional claims is coextensive with that of an adult, it illustrated its
unwillingness to adopt this conclusion as a uniform standard.31 By
articulating its three-pronged justification, the Court established an
analytical framework for lower courts to apply in evaluating subse-
quent State regulations on children's rights.32
In Ginsberg v. New York, 33 the Court illustrated its concern re-
garding the inability of children to make mature and informed
choices by placing limitations on their First Amendment rights.34 It
explained that "even where there is an invasion of protected free-
doms, 'the power of the State to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.' 3 In other
26. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 649. The statute required parental consent before an abortion could
be performed on an unmarried woman under the age of 18. See id. If one or both
parents refused to consent, however, the abortion could be obtained by order of a
judge of the superior court for good cause shown. See id.
29. See id. at 634. The Court explained that because the status of minors under
the law is unique in many respects, children's constitutional rights cannot be equated
with those of adults. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 634-35.
32. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) ("The State has a
strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity,
inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise
their rights wisely." (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634-39)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (noting that the state as parens patriae may restrict parents'
control over minors to guard the general interest in youths' well-being).
33. 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that a New York statute prohibiting the sale of
obscene materials to minors under 17 years of age did not invade constitutional rights
guaranteed to minors).
34. See id. The Court recognized that "the State has an interest 'to protect the
welfare of children' and to see that they are 'safeguarded from abuses' which might
prevent their 'growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens."'
Id. at 640-41.
35. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 170).
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words, in its role as parens patriae,36 the State can limit children's
constitutional rights to afford them necessary protections and en-
sure their safety and well-being.37
By 1979, the realm of children's rights stood in a wholly different
place than it had in 1925 with cases like Pierce. In the eyes of the
law, children were no longer property of their parents.38 With its
unprecedented decisions in Gault and Tinker, the Court made clear
that children have rights separate from their parents.39 Although
the Court demonstrated its unwillingness to equate children's
rights with those of adults, it emphasized the importance of recog-
nizing and protecting the constitutional rights of children."a The
tug of war between the State and parent was replaced by the bal-
ancing act of the State, parent and child.4
Despite the Court's tremendous advancements in the realm of
children's rights, however, the law remains unsettled.42 With each
new challenge, the Court continues to shape the body of law that
36. See id. The term "parens patriae," which literally means "parent of the coun-
try," traditionally refers to the:
role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such
as juveniles or the insane, . . . and in child custody determinations, when
acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the
principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of them-
selves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents
.... Parens patriae originates from the English common law where the King
had a royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities
such as infants. In the United States, the parens patriae function belongs with
the states.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). Under the doctrine of parens patrie,
"the state has standing to sue as a representative of its citizens only where it can
allege injuries to a 'quasi-sovereign interest,' or to put it another way, where it can
allege injuries to interests which 'affect her citizens at large.'" Lucas v. Planning Bd.,
7 F. Supp.2d 310, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
37. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
38. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
40. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
41. See id.; see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) ("Three sepa-
rate but related interests-the interest in the welfare of the pregnant minor, the inter-
est of the parents, and the interest of the family unit-are relevant to our
consideration of the constitutionality of the 48-hour waiting period and the two-par-
ent notification requirement.").
42. See, e.g., Peter S. Smith, Addressing the Plight of Inner-City Schools: The Fed-
eral Right to Education After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 18 WHITTIER L.
REV. 825, 831-32 (1997) ("[Tjhe competing interests created by the complex relation-
ship of child, parent and state are unsettled under current law.").
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defines children's rights.43 One unresolved aspect of the law is that
which governs in-home strip searches of a child in child abuse
investigations.
B. Identifying the Interests of the Child and the Parents
The nude search of a child's body implicates Fourth Amendment
concerns.44 Therefore, it is necessary to understand the relevant
legal standards before evaluating the search's constitutionality.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the
Federal Government shall not violate "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. ' 45 To ensure the protection of this
liberty, the law generally requires police to obtain a warrant prior
to conducting a search and seizure. 46 The Fourth Amendment,
43. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (recognizing
that the constitutionally protected right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision
whether to terminate her pregnancy); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (holding that the wear-
ing of armbands in school by students and teachers to express certain views is pro-
tected by the First Amendment); Gault, 387 U.S. at 1 (holding that the safeguards of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments protected a 15-year-old boy accused in juvenile
court of a charge that threatened years of imprisonment).
44. See supra notes 4-5.
45. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
46. Id.; see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) ("The Fourth Amend-
ment generally requires police to secure a warrant before conducting a search."); Cal-
ifornia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389 (1985) (noting that the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved by a requirement
that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that a search is reasonable
only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause); United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) ("Searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances."); Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 (1983) (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires the
existence of probable cause before a warrant is issued); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 581 (1980) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment forbids police entry into a
private home to search for and seize an object without a warrant); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) ("[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's
home or his person unless 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment."); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971)
(noting that the Fourth Amendment requires searches be conducted pursuant to a
warrant).
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however, does not operate as an absolute safeguard against inva-
sions of an individual's right to security in person and property.47
The ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a search is rea-
sonableness. 48 The reasonableness of a search is determined by
considering whether the search was justified at its inception and
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place.49 This balancing test requires weigh-
ing "its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interest
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 50
Thus, in the context of strip searches in child abuse investigations,
the privacy interests of the child and the parents as well as the par-
ents' interest in family integrity and parental authority must be bal-
anced against the State's interest in keeping children free from
harm.
1. Interests of the Child
On one hand, to determine whether a nude search of a child's
body during a child abuse investigation is reasonable, courts must
consider the child's constitutionally protected right to privacy.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly recognize any pri-
vacy right, the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's privacy
interests in his home.5 1 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court con-
cluded in Gault,52 the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of
Rights provide the same protections to children as they do to
adults.53 In New Jersey v. T.L. 0., 5 the Court emphasized that "a
search of a child's person ... no less than a similar search carried
out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective ex-
47. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (holding that a
public school district's student athlete drug policy did not violate student's federal or
state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches).
48. See id. at 652.
49. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (holding that the search of a student's purse by
public school officials was reasonable and that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school
officials).
50. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). In Skinner, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment was applicable to drug and alcohol testing mandated or author-
ized by Federal Railroad Administration regulations. See id. Furthermore, the Court
concluded that the tests were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
634.
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
53. See id. at 13.
54. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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pectations of privacy. '55 Similarly, in Doe v. Renfrow,56 the Dis-
trict Court of the Northern District of Indiana stated that
"subjecting a student to a nude search is ... an intrusion into an
individual's basic justifiable expectation of privacy. ' 57  Thus,
merely on account of his age, a child is not outside the boundaries
of protection afforded by the Constitution.58
Courts also carefully consider the nature of this invasion of pri-
vacy. In Terry v. Ohio,59 the Supreme Court held that even a lim-
ited search of outer clothing "constitutes a severe . . . intrusion
upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoy-
ing, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience."6 More re-
cently, the Court in T.L.O. recognized that "even a limited search
of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy."'" In Bell v. Wolf-
ish,6" Justice Stevens described the body cavity search as "clearly
the greatest personal indignity. 63
A strip search is a traumatic experience and a significant inva-
sion of a child's privacy. 64 A nude search of a child's body not only
causes a child to be embarrassed and uncomfortable, but may also
cause long-term negative psychological effects.65 Moreover, the
55. Id. at 337-38.
56. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (holding that nude search of student solely
upon continued alert of trained drug-detecting canine after she emptied her pockets
was unreasonable).
57. Id. at 1024.
58. See id.
59. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
60. Id. at 24-25.
61. 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
62. 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (ruling that the practice of visual body-cavity searches of
inmates following contact visits does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
63. Id. at 594 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,
723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing strip searches as "demeaning, dehu-
manizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive,
signifying degradation and submission").
64. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38; Bell, 441 U.S. at
520.
65. See Scott A. Gartner, Note, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really
Learned at School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 921 (1997). Gartner states that:
many children subjected to strip searches at school undergo treatment by
child psychologists and psychiatrists, who predict that some of their patients
will have lasting emotional scars as a result of the search.... In fact, the risk
of emotional harm leads one vocal opponent to declare: "Strip searches by
school officials are tantamount to child abuse and are ethically and constitu-
tionally unacceptable." A strip search certainly is frightening, degrading,
and often unconscionable in light of the circumstances that gave rise to it. A
child may well remember a strip search forever, and the emotional scars can
endure equally long.
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strip search of a child implicates concerns that are not associated
with strip searches of adults and that magnify the severity of
trauma to the child.66 As children approach adolescence, they be-
gin to be aware of their developing and changing bodies.67 Accord-
ingly, they develop a greater expectation of privacy with respect to
their nude bodies than they have at a younger age.68 In addition,
they tend to be more self-conscious about their bodies, making a
nude search even more humiliating.69
Furthermore, in assessing the reasonableness of a strip search
during a child abuse investigation, courts must consider the child's
right to personal privacy. The right to personal privacy includes
the ability to make certain kinds of important decisions privately
and free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.7 ° The
Supreme Court has considered this aspect of privacy when evaluat-
ing minors' freedom to make significant decisions regarding their
bodies.71 These decisions include whether to have an abortion72
Id. at 930-31.
66. See, e.g., Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). In Meese, the District Court of
California recognized that "[c]hildren are especially susceptible to possible traumas
from strip searches." Id. at 667. Furthermore, it stated that "[y]outh is more than a
chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage." Id. (citing Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)); see also Gartner, supra note 65, at 930. Gartner
explains that:
[y]oung people may find the experience more traumatic than adults for a
number of reasons: First, "as children approach adolescence, privacy be-
comes important as a marker of independence and self-differentiation.
Threats to the privacy of school-aged children may be reasonably hypothe-
sized to ... threats to self-esteem." Second, adolescents tend to be more
self-conscious about their bodies than other age groups, making a strip
search all the more humiliating.
Gartner, supra note 65, at 930 (citing Gary B. Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal
and Psychological Concepts Compatible?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 455, 488 (1983)).
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
68. See Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Con-
fidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509 (1998). Marrus
notes that "[c]hildren have a strong need for privacy in adolescence. During this time,
children begin to explore their own identity and get a sense of who they are as indi-
viduals. This builds within them a need to protect and insure their right to privacy."
Id. at 542 (citations omitted).
69. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
70. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (noting that the right to
privacy encompasses the right of an individual to be free in action, thought, experi-
ence, and belief from governmental compulsion (citing Kurland, The Private I, U.
CHI. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 8)).
71. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (recognizing that
the constitutionally protected right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision
whether to terminate her pregnancy).
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and whether to use contraception.13 Thus, it follows that this con-
stitutionally-protected zone of privacy encompasses a child's choice
to allow his body to be stripped and searched.
Courts also must consider a child's right to be free from harm.
In B.H. v. Johnson,74 the District Court of the Northern District of
Illinois held that a child in foster care has substantive due process
rights to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions on
both her physical and emotional well-being.75 The court articu-
lated that "children are by their nature in a developmental phase of
their lives, and their exposure to traumatic experiences can have an
indelible effect upon their emotional and psychological develop-
ment."76 While the court's decision in B.H. was limited to children
in the context of foster care,77 it illustrates that children have a
right to be free from harm in general.
72. See id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right of
privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the right of privacy encompasses an
individual's right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion regarding the
decision whether to bear or beget a child).
73. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438.
74. 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989). In B.H., children who had been removed
from their families and placed in custody of a state social services agency brought a
class action against the director of the state agency. See id. at 1395. The District
Court of the Northern District of Illinois held that the children had a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim to be free from arbitrary intrusions on
their physical and emotional well-being while directly or indirectly in state custody
and to be provided with adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care and minimally
adequate training to secure these basic constitutional rights. See id. at 1396. It also
concluded, however, that the children did not have other substantive due process
claims, such as a right to placement in the least restrictive setting and sibling visita-
tion. See id. at 1397-98.
75. See id. at 1395.
76. Id.; see also DAVID A. WOLFE, PREVENTING PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL ABUSE
OF CHILDREN 31 (1991). Abused children have been reported to be developmentally
delayed, behaviorally disordered, and recognizably different from their age peers. See
id. at 32. Studies indicate that abused children have higher rates of externalizing dis-
orders (e.g. higher rates of aggression, acting out, and hyperactivity). See id. Studies
also describe abused children as being delayed in language development. See id. Fur-
thermore, these children are more likely to show signs of failure in normal adaptation.
See id. at 35. The National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System reports that physi-
cal neglect can severely impact a child's development by causing failure to thrive,
malnutrition, serious illness, physical harm resulting from lack of supervision, and a
lifetime of low self-esteem. See National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Answers to Common Questions
About Child Abuse and Neglect (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.americanhumane.
org/children/factsheets/emot-abuse.html>. Emotional abuse can lead to poor self-im-
age, alcohol and drug abuse, destructive behavior and even suicide. See id.
77. See B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1395.
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2. Interests of the Parents
In determining the constitutionality of strip searches in child
abuse investigations, courts must also consider the parents' right to
privacy and family integrity. The Supreme Court has long recog-
nized and protected a family's fundamental right to exercise paren-
tal autonomy and to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into family privacy.78 It has articulated that "the family
has a privacy interest in it's children's upbringing and education
which is constitutionally protected against undue State interfer-
ence." 79 According to the Court, the Constitution protects family
sanctity because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in the
nation's history and tradition.8 °
As early as 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska,81 the Court recognized
the "essential" right of parents to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control. 82 In Griswold v. Connecticut,8 3
the Court first recognized a fundamental right to familial privacy.84
78. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to freedom of
privacy in family life is fundamental whether derived from the First, Ninth or Four-
teenth Amendments); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (recognizing the funda-
mental right to family integrity as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Ninth Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (stating that
the right to marry, establish a home, and rear one's children as one deems fit are
among one's basic civil rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a parent has a fundamental con-
stitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of its child); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a parent has a fundamental constitutional
right in directing the upbringing and education of his/her child); In re Phillip B., 92
Cal. App. 3d 796 (1979) (recognizing that parental autonomy is a fundamental consti-
tutional right).
79. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (invalidating the provision of a
Minnesota statute requiring two-parent notification of a minor's abortion decision
and upholding the provision requiring two-parent notification unless pregnant minor
obtains judicial bypass).
80. See, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
81. Id.
82. See id. In Meyer, the Court invalidated a Nebraska statute that banned the
teaching of any subject in any language other than English because it deprived par-
ents and teachers of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 403. The Court based its decision in large part on the right of
parents to control the education of their children. See id. at 401.
83. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Connecticut law forbidding use of con-
traceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy).
84. See id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg stated that, without doubt,
personal liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
... to marry, establish a home and bring up children." Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring) (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399). Furthermore, Justice Goldberg noted, "[t]he
entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific
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The Court in Moore v. City of Cleveland85 emphasized that "free-
dom of personal choice in matters of ... family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. '86  Courts have afforded these rights protection
under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment as well as the Ninth Amendment. 87 In deter-
mining the reasonableness of a search in child abuse investigations,
courts carefully weigh these rights against those of the child and
the State.
C. Balancing the Interests of the Child and the Parents against
the Interests of the State
While it is well established that the child's right to privacy and
the parents' rights to family autonomy and privacy are fundamen-
tal, they are not absolute. 88 The State may invade these constitu-
guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a
family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically pro-
tected." Id. at 495.
85. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a city ordinance limiting occupancy of any
dwelling unit to members of the same "family" where the ordinance narrowly defined
family as including only a few categories of related individuals violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
86. Id. at 499 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974)). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 495-96; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-44 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-401.
87. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (finding the right to privacy in the penum-
bras that emanate from the guarantees of the Bill of Rights). The Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In Griswold, Justice Harlan found
the right to privacy in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it is a basic value implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. See 381 U.S. at 479. The
Supreme Court has construed the concept of ordered liberty to mean a "principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). The Ninth Amend-
ment provides that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. IX. In Griswold, Justice Goldberg stated that the concept of marital privacy is
found in the Ninth Amendment, which revealed that the framers of the Constitution
believed there are fundamental rights protected from governmental intrusion but not
enumerated in the text. See 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
88. See, e.g., Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that visual
inspections by state social workers of unclothed children for evidence of child abuse
are searches under the Fourth Amendment); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (citing
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tionally-protected arenas if there exists a compelling interest and
the means of doing so are narrowly tailored. 9 On many occasions,
the Supreme Court has deferred to the State's interest in placing
limitations on the rights of children and families. 90
For example, in assessing the constitutionality of statutes restrict-
ing a minor's access to abortion, the Court illustrates its concern
for the health and well-being of children by upholding restrictions
on a child's right to privacy. 91 In Hodgson v. Minnesota,92 the
Court articulated that "the state has a strong and legitimate inter-
est in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperi-
ence and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to
exercise their rights wisely." 93 Based on this reasoning, the Court
upheld a two-parent notification provision that required both par-
ents' involvement in their minor daughter's decision whether to
terminate her pregnancy.94 The Court explained that a child's right
Prince, 321 U.S. at 166) (cautioning that while the Constitution protects a family's
right to privacy, the family is not beyond regulation). In Moore, the Court noted,
however, that when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living ar-
rangements, the Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regula-
tion. See id. (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
89. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 772 n.12 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring). In Glucksberg, the Court explained that "[t]he dual dimensions of the
strength and the fitness of the government's interest are succinctly captured in the so-
called 'compelling interest test,' under which regulations that substantially burden a
constitutionally protected (or 'fundamental') liberty may be sustained only if 'nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'" Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 302 (1993)); see also, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (holding that regulations imposing a burden on decision
as fundamental as whether to bear or beget a child may be justified only by compel-
ling state interest and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests). "How
compelling the interest and how narrow the tailoring must be will depend, of course,
not only on the substantiality of the individual's own liberty interest, but also on the
extent of the burden placed upon it." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 772 (citing Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871-74 (1992)).
90. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
91. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding an
Ohio abortion statute requiring that parental notice be given by physician performing
abortion and requiring minor to prove maturity or best interest by clear and convinc-
ing evidence when using judicial bypass); Matheson, 450 U.S. at 398.
92. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
93. Id. at 444 (citations omitted).
94. See id. The Minnesota statute provided, with certain exceptions, that no abor-
tion could be performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48 hours
after both of her parents had been notified. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West
1981). The notice was mandatory unless (1) the attending physician certified that an
immediate abortion was necessary to prevent the woman's death and there was insuf-
ficient time to provide the required notice; (2) both of her parents had consented in
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to privacy is not absolute and may be limited by State regulation to
adequately safeguard a child's unique vulnerability and needs.
95
Similarly, in Vernonia School District v. Acton,96 the Court con-
cluded that the State's legitimate interest in deterring drug abuse
among children justified its random urinalysis requirement for stu-
dent athletes and the accompanying invasion of privacy.97 It again
recognized that children's constitutional rights are often subject to
limitations. 98 The Court explained that, while children have a de-
creased expectation of privacy in the schoolhouse,99 student ath-
letes have an even less legitimate privacy expectation.100 The
Court's decision illustrated its willingness to permit an invasion of
constitutionally-protected rights to further a legitimate State goal.
writing; or, (3) the woman declared that she was a victim of parental abuse or neglect,
in which event notice of her declaration must have been given to the proper authori-
ties. See id.
95. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634
(1979) (holding that children's rights were not equal to those of adults because of "the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing").
96. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
97. See id. at 664-65.
98. See id. at 654.
99. See id. at 656-57. In Vernonia, the Court articulated that a child's constitu-
tional rights are different in public schools than elsewhere. See id. It explained that
the "reasonableness" inquiry must account for the schools' custodial and tutelary re-
sponsibility for children. See id. For their own good and that of their classmates,
public school children are routinely required to submit to various physical examina-
tions, and to be vaccinated against various diseases. See id. Particularly with regard
to medical examinations and procedures, therefore, "students within the school envi-
ronment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population gener-
ally." Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
100. See id. at 657. The Court in Vernonia went on to explain that student athletes
have an even lesser expectation of privacy. See id. It stated that:
[s]chool sports are not for the bashful. They require "suiting up" before
each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public
school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for
the privacy they afford. The locker rooms in Vernonia are typical: No indi-
vidual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined up along a wall,
unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not even all the toilet stalls
have doors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has noted, there is "an element of communal undress inherent in athletic
participation."
Id. (citing Schaell v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir.
1988)). Furthermore, the Court explained that another reason why student athletes
have a reduced expectation of privacy is that by choosing to join a team, "they volun-
tarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on
students generally." Id. Thus, "students who voluntarily participate in school athlet-
ics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including pri-
vacy." Id. (citations omitted).
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Like the interest defined in Hodgson and Vernonia, the State's
interests in conducting a strip search in child abuse investigations is
weighty. Courts have long held that the State has a legitimate in-
terest in keeping children free from physical and emotional
harm.' In B.H. v. Johnson,"°' the District Court of the Northern
District of Illinois stated that "a child's physical and emotional
well-being are equally important."'0 3 As the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated in Wyman v. James,'10 4 "there is no more worthy object of
the public's concern."'0 5 At the core of this interest is the State's
perception of children as vulnerable, immature, and needy of pro-
tection.10 6 The Court's line of reasoning from Bellotti to Vernonia
illustrates that the State may place limitations on children's consti-
tutional rights to account for their "peculiar vulnerability" and af-
ford them necessary protections.
In addition, federal and state statutes demonstrate the State's in-
terest in safeguarding children from harm. For example, in 1974,
101. See, e.g., United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (recognizing
the state interest in protecting children from psychological, emotional, and mental
harm). In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, the District Court of Pennsylvania
emphasized that in situations where "harm to the physical or mental health of the
child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate
state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of
their children." 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Application of President and Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc.,
118 U.S.App.D.C. 80 (1964); In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900 (1972); People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mem'l Hosp. v.
Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1962)).
102. 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. 111. 1989).
103. Id. at 1395 ("Children are by their nature in a developmental phase of their
lives and their exposure to traumatic experiences can have an indelible effect upon
their emotional and psychological development and cause more lasting damage than
many strictly physical injuries.").
104. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). In Wyman, recipients of state aid to families with depen-
dent children brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief preventing termi-
nation of benefits for failure to consent to a welfare official's entry into the recipient's
home. See id. The Court held that the home visitation, as structured by the New
York statutes and regulations, was a reasonable administrative tool and served a valid
and proper administrative purpose for the dispensation of the AFDC program. See
id. at 325. Furthermore, it concluded that the home visits were not unwarranted inva-
sions of personal privacy and violated no right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
See id.
105. Id. at 318. The Court further stated that "It]he dependent child's needs are
paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of
comparative values, to a position secondary to what the mother claims as her rights."
Id.
106. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979) (holding that children's rights were not equal to those of adults be-
cause of children's vulnerability and immaturity and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing).
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Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
("CAPTA" or the "Act"). °7 CAPTA allocated money to the
States for the identification, treatment, and prevention of child
abuse. 8 To be eligible for funds, each state had to provide for the
reporting of known or suspected child abuse, immunity to report-
ers from civil and criminal liability, investigation of reports by the
proper state authority, and insurance of the health and welfare of
any children in a household where abuse was detected. 10 9
CAPTA's express purpose was to help states implement pro-
grams to deal with the problem of child abuse."' The Act reflected
Congress's realization that, despite already existing reporting and
immunity laws, underreporting still hindered efforts to aid abused
children."' The legislative history of the Act also illustrates Con-
gress's concern that not all states had laws requiring further investi-
gation or treatment of reported cases." Thus, an important aspect
of the Act was its focus on intervention." 3 By passing this federal
legislation, Congress demonstrated its significant interest in keep-
ing children free from harm and its hope that states would enact
similar legislation." 4
Although prior to CAPTA most states already complied with
many of its requirements, the federal statute had substantial influ-
ence on subsequent state reporting statutes." 5 In particular, by
bringing the immunity provisions to the public's attention, CAPTA
led to an increase in the number of reported cases of child abuse." 6
107. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1976). The Act was an attempt by Congress to encourage
reporting of suspected child abuse. See Eric P. Gifford, Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Social Worker Immunity: A Cause of Action Denied, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1013,
1025 (1995) (citing Richard A. Gardner, Apparatchiks Turn "Child Abuse" into
"Witch Hunt", N.J. L.J., Mar. 1993, at A17).
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(1) (1994), repealed by Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 103, 110 Stat. 3063, 3066.
109. See id. § 5103(b)(2).
110. See H.R. REP. No. 93-685 at 2-4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2763,
2765-66 (concluding that the federal government needed to take an increased role in
supporting state and local child welfare agencies).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 2765 (stating that most state laws did not "require any followup or
treatment once a case of abuse had been reported").
113. See Caroline T. Trost, Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA
Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 183, 193-94 (1998).
114. See id.
115. See Brian G. Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at
the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes,
54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 649 (1978).
116. See Child Welfare: Where Should Our Priorities Be? Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Early Childhood, Youth & Families of the House Comm. on Economic and
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The Act also facilitated states' efforts to organize child protective
systems designed to respond to reports of suspected abuse and ne-
glect and may have increased states' awareness of the need to fund
these programs. 117
By articulating national policy, the Act guided state legislatures
in formulating policy at the local level.118 Many states enacted stat-
utes aimed at prevention and investigation of child abuse.119 These
statutes mandate criminal penalties for convictions of child abuse
and neglect. 120 Some of the state legislation also include provisions
requiring the state to fund programs to prevent child abuse and
neglect.121 Like federal laws, these statutes illustrate the significant
State interest in protecting children from harm.
Educational Opportunities, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Anne Cohn Donnelly,
Executive Director, National Committee on the Prevention of Child Abuse), 1995
WL 35279 (F.D.C.H. Jan. 31, 1995). An estimated 60,000 reports were made in 1974.
See id. In 1993 there were just under 3,000,000. See id.
117. See Monrad G. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legis-
lation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 48 (1967) (complaining that in 1967 too few states had
appropriated additional funds for extending services to new cases revealed by
mandatory reporting).
118. See Fraser, supra note 115, at 651; see also Trost, supra note 113, at 193.
119. The New York Family Court Act states that "[w]here there is probable cause
to believe that an abused or neglected child may be found on premises, an order
under this section may authorize a person conducting the child protective investiga-
tion, accompanied by a police officer, to enter the premises to determine whether
such a child is present." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 1034 (McKinney 1999). Alabama's
Child Abuse Act provides that "[a] responsible person, as defined in Section 26-15-2,
who shall torture, willfully abuse, cruelly beat or otherwise willfully maltreat any child
under the age of 18 years shall, on conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 10 years." ALA. CODE § 26-15-3
(1975). Mississippi's state law provides that:
Any parent, guardian or other person who willfully commits any act or omits
the performance of any duty, which act or omission contributes to or tends
to contribute to the neglect or delinquency of any child or which act or omis-
sion results in the abuse and/or battering of any child, as defined in Section
43-21-105(m) of the Youth Court Law... upon conviction shall be punished
by a fine not to exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or by imprison-
ment not to exceed one (1) year in jail, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-39 (1999). South Carolina's Domestic Relations Law states
that:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who
shall, without lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide, as defined in § 20-
7-490, the proper care and attention for such child or helpless person, so that
the life, health or comfort of such child or helpless person is endangered or is
likely to be endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be pun-
ished within the discretion of the circuit court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (1985).
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-15-3 (1975).
121. Arizona's law states that:
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Federal case law also demonstrates the State's interest in safe-
guarding children from danger. In Darryl H. v. Coler,122 two fami-
lies brought a Fourth Amendment challenge against the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services for allowing social
workers to conduct nude searches of their children for evidence of
child abuse where certain "hot-line" criteria were met. 2 3 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that visual inspections conducted by State offi-
cials of unclothed children for evidence of child abuse implicated
Subject to legislative appropriation, the director shall expend monies in the
fund to provide financial assistance to community child abuse and neglect
prevention programs and family resource programs that, in the judgment of
the director, offer prevention services and family resource programs to chil-
dren and their parents or guardians and that comply with departmental ac-
counting and auditing rules for the receipt of public monies.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-550.01.B (West 1999). California's state law provides:
There is hereby created in the State Treasury a fund which shall be known as
the State Children's Trust Fund. The fund shall consist of ... money appro-
priated to the fund for this purpose by the Legislature. [M]oney in the State
Children's Trust Fund is . . . for the purpose of funding child abuse and
neglect prevention and intervention programs.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18969 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999). The District of Colum-
bia's statute states:
There is established in the District of Columbia a private nonprofit corpora-
tion which shall be known as the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Chil-
dren's Trust Fund ("Trust Fund"). The sole purpose of the Trust Fund is to
encourage child abuse and child neglect prevention programs. The Trust
Fund shall accept federal funds granted by Congress or Executive Order.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2132 (1981).
122. 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that visual inspection that occurred four
months after the initial report of child abuse did not constitute exigent
circumstances).
123. See id. at 903.
The [Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ["DCFS"], Child
Abuse and Neglect Investigation Decisions] Handbook [of 1982] establishes
five criteria (hot-line criteria) which must be met before the DCFS will in-
vestigate allegations of abuse or neglect. To constitute a report which re-
quires further investigation, the DCFS must receive information that:
(1) a child less than eighteen years old is involved;
(2) the child was either harmed or in danger of harm;
(3) a specific incident of abuse is identified;
(4) a parent, caretaker, sibling or babysitter is the alleged perpetrator of
neglect; or
(5) a parent, caretaker, adult family member, adult individual residing in the
child's home, parent's paramour, sibling or babysitter is the alleged per-
petrator of abuse.
A report which meets the hot-line criteria receives a priority ranking based
on the risk to the child, and a DCFS caseworker is assigned to investigate the
allegations. Following the procedures outlined in the Handbook and the
Memorandum, the caseworker begins a fact-finding process which is
designed to determine if credible evidence of abuse or neglect exists.
Id. at 895.
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Fourth Amendment concerns.124 The court concluded, however,
that the search was constitutional because the State's compelling
interest in safeguarding children from injury and death outweighed
the substantial intrusion into a child's right to privacy. 125
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT
REQUIREMENT: CONSENT AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
A. The Consent Exception
In formulating a uniform standard according to which strip
searches in child abuse investigations should be conducted, it is
necessary to establish whether children have a right to consent to
the entrance into their home and search by State officials of their
body for evidence of child abuse. Generally, only individuals with
"common authority 126 can consent to entrance into a residence. 27
Courts have held that determining who possesses this authority de-
pends upon whether the person, as a practical matter, has joint ac-
cess or control over the area. 128 Despite the general rule that
children do not exercise "common authority" 129 and thus cannot
validly consent to entry, some authorities believe that older chil-
dren possess the authority to give valid consent.13 This viewpoint,
124. See id. at 900.
125. See id. at 906.
126. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (holding that consent to a war-
rantless search by one who possesses common authority over the premises is valid as
against "absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared"). The
Court stated that:
[c]ommon authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property
interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the
third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant
historical and legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the prop-
erty by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so
that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right
to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed
the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched.
Id. at 171 n.7 (citations omitted); see also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)
(holding that a night hotel clerk could not validly consent to the search of a cus-
tomer's room); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (holding that a land-
lord could not validly consent to the search of a house that he had rented to another).
127. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.
128. See id. at 170-71.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.4, at 728 (1.978 & Supp. 1986).
LaFave argues that:
teenagers may have authority to grant permission to police to look around
generally, but not to make an intrusive search throughout the house. By
contrast, an eight-year-old may only have authority to permit an adult to
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in contrast to the rationale in Bellotti,1 3 1 suggests that mere minor-
ity status cannot justly be equated with the inability to make in-
formed and mature decisions.132 Although only a minority of
courts adopt this viewpoint,133 the lack of a uniform rule of law
indicates the uncertainty that remains regarding consent in child
abuse investigations.
Because the strip search in child abuse investigations involves
the health and safety of the child, deciding who should have the
authority to consent to the search raises concerns similar to those
in children's medical treatment. Currently, the law does not afford
children a constitutional right to make their own medical deci-
sions. The doctrine of informed consent requires that three con-
ditions be met for a treatment decision to be legally valid:135 "the
decision must be informed (i.e., the patient must be provided with
adequate information about the proposed and alternative treat-
ments), voluntary (i.e., the patient must make the treatment deci-
sion free from coercion or unfair inducements), and competent. 1 36
Additionally, this legal standard demands that the individual con-
senting to medical treatment have a mature appreciation of the
treatment and its potential consequences.137 Many courts hold that
a child under the age of eighteen does not possess the intellectual
step into the entry way of the home because this is often done with regard to
visitors or salespersons.
Id.
131. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796 (1979). In Phillip B., a petition
was filed in juvenile court alleging that a 12-year-old boy was not provided with the
necessities of life and requesting that he be declared a dependent of the court for the
purposes of insuring that he receive cardiac surgery for a congenital defect. See id.
The boy also suffered from Down's Syndrome and had been in a residential care
facility since birth. See id. Medical testimony noted the risk of cardiac surgery, the
higher-than-average risk of postoperative complications for Down's Syndrome chil-
dren, and the presence of pulmonary vascular changes in the boy, further increasing
the risk. See id. The boy's parents had refused consent. See id. The Court of Ap-
peals for the First District of California held that, although parental autonomy is con-
stitutionally protected by Fourteenth Amendment, the state has the right to protect
children. See id. The court set forth factors to be considered before a state insists on
medical treatment rejected by parents: "the seriousness of the harm to the child, pro-
fessional medical evaluations, the risks involved in treatment, the child's preference,
and, underlying all, the best interests of the child." Id.
135. See Lois A. WEITHORN, CHILDREN'S CAPACITIES IN LEGAL CONTEXTS, CHIL-
DREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW 35-39 (1984).
136. Id. (citing A. Meisel et al., Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 134 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 285-89 (1977)).
137. See id.
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and emotional capacities necessary to develop this higher level of
understanding. 138 Thus, parents have discretion to consent to or
refuse medical treatment for their children without regard to their
children's wishes.'
39
In assessing a child's ability to consent to a strip search during a
child abuse investigation, however, one must consider that studies
concerning the competency of minors to consent to treatment indi-
cate that children are capable of making decisions with almost the
same degree of competency as adults. 140  This research demon-
strates that "the capacity of children to weigh benefits and risks to
requests to participate in research or treatment decisions has re-
vealed much of what common sense would suggest - namely, that
older teenagers still legally defined as minors are no less capable
than are adults.' 4' The studies show that minors fifteen years old
and older make decisions regarding medical treatment in generally
the same way as adults. 142 In addition, these studies reveal that
children as young as nine or ten will choose some of the same out-
comes as adults in certain situations despite differences in their rea-
soning. 143  These findings suggest that a higher level of
understanding and sophisticated reasoning is not a prerequisite for
reaching a mature, rational decision. 144
Some courts have established a "mature minor" doctrine al-
lowing minors to consent to health care where the minor is near
138. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). "Most children, even in
adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many deci-
sions, including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make
those judgments." Id.
139. See id. "The right to family association includes the right of parents to make
important medical decisions for their children, and of children to have those decisions
made by their parents rather than the state." Wallis v. Spencer, 193 F.3d 1054, 1069
(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (holding that it is in the interest of both
parents and children that parents have ultimate authority to make medical decisions
for their children unless a "neutral fact finder" determines, through a due process
hearing, that the parent is not acting in the child's best interests)).
140. See G. KOOCHER & P. KEITH-SPIEGEL, CHILDREN, ETHICS & THE LAW (1990);
see also Grant, Consent in Pediatrics: A Complex Teaching Assignment, 17 J. MED.
ETHICS 199, 202 (1991) (concluding that the cognitive development of a fourteen-
year-old was sufficient to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of obtaining a preg-
nancy and AIDS test).
141. Koocher, supra note 140, at 111.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. The studies provide statistical data about the competency of healthy children.
To address the capacities of mentally disabled minors to give consent to medical treat-
ment, further research would be necessary. For the purposes of this Note, however, it




the age of majority, the treatment is less than "major" or "serious,"
and the treatment is for the minor's benefit rather than for that of a
third party. 145 Under this principle, the minor may also refuse
medical treatment. 46 Only a minority of courts, however, have
adopted the "mature minor" doctrine.1 47 Furthermore, the juris-
dictions that use the doctrine do so solely with regard to less im-
portant medical decisions. 148
At the core of the rule of law affording parents discretion to
make medical decisions for their children is the presumption that
the parents will act in the best interest of their child. It is impor-
tant, however, in determining whether children should have the au-
thority to consent in child abuse investigations, to consider that the
Supreme Court has carved out exceptions for situations in which
parents' motives are suspect.149 In Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth,5 ' the Court held that "the unique nature and consequences
145. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (I11. 989) (holding that a minor whom the
court has determined by clear and convincing evidence to possess the requisite degree
of maturity has limited right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and that a
parent who acquiesces in mature minor's decision to reject life-sustaining medical
treatment is not guilty of neglect).
146. See, e.g., Jennifer Fouts Skeels, In re E.G.: The Right of Mature Minors in
Illinois to Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1199 (1990) (dis-
cussing the effect of the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in E.G. that a "mature minor"
has the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment); E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 322. But see
Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp. of Port Jervis, 459 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1983) (discussing the
common-law rule that a minor is not legally competent to give binding consent to any
medical services rendered to him or herself).
147. See, e.g., In re A.M.P., 708 N.E.2d 1235 (I11. 999) (holding that employing the
mature minor doctrine was proper in determining whether a minor is capable of mak-
ing independent decisions about medical treatment); In re Petition of Anonymous 1,
558 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 1997) (accepting the mature minor doctrine as proper proce-
dure for determining whether a minor is capable of making independent decisions
about medical treatment); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 860 F. Supp. 1409 (D.S.D.
1994) ("State and parental interests must yield to the constitutional right of a mature
minor, or of an immature minor whose best interests are contrary to parental involve-
ment, to obtain an abortion without consulting or notifying the parent or parents.");
Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that mature minors have
the capacity to consent in medical malpractice cases). But see O.G. v. Baum, 790
S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. 1990) (noting that Texas has never adopted or recognized the
"mature minor" doctrine).
148. See, e.g., A.M.P., 708 N.E.2d at 1238 (employing the mature minor doctrine to
determine if a minor is mature enough to consent to electroconvulsive therapy). But
see E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 328 (explaining that under Illinois law, if a 17-year-old firmly
expressed the desire to follow her religious beliefs to the exclusion of the life-saving
operation the court must respect the mature minor's decision).
149. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (recognizing that
the constitutionally protected right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision
whether to terminate her pregnancy).
150. Id.
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of the abortion decision make it inappropriate to give a third party
an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, re-
gardless of the reason for withholding consent. ' 151 In doing so, the
Court recognized the possibility that when parents veto the deci-
sion of their daughter to have an abortion, they may not be acting
in the best interest of their child. 152 Abortion may be contrary to
the parents' religious beliefs.1 53 Alternatively, parents may fear
that they will be marked by shame if others discover that their
daughter has terminated her pregnancy.1 54 By affording the minor
the right to decide whether to have an abortion, the Court protects
against arbitrary decisions by parents that may be inconsistent with
the child's welfare and motivated by suspect reasoning.155
Regarding contraception, the law also recognizes a minor's right
to privacy and affords her the power to decide whether to bear a
child. In Doe v. Irwin,'5 6 the Sixth Circuit held that a publicly op-
erated family planning clinic could distribute contraceptives to mi-
nors without notifying the minor's parents.157 The court explained
that a minor's right to privacy includes her right to obtain contra-
ceptives. 158 As the Supreme Court recognized in Danforth,159 the
court here acknowledged the possibility that parents' involvement
may interfere with the minor's constitutional rights.1 60 The use of
contraception may be inconsistent with the parents' religious con-
victions. 6' Parents may believe that making contraceptives read-
ily available encourages or condones sexual activity and may not
151. Id. at 74.
152. See id. The Court pointed out that "[a]ny independent interest the parent may
have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than
the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become preg-
nant." Id. at 75. "[lit is far from uncommon for parents to seek treatment of a minor,
in part, because of concern about behavior, sexual orientation, or opinions contrary to
the parents' moral or religious beliefs." Jan C. Costello, Making Kids Take Their
Medicine: The Privacy and Due Process Rights of De Facto Competent Minors, 31




156. 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a publicly operated family planning
center's practice of distributing contraceptives to unemancipated minors without no-
tice to their parents did not infringe upon a constitutional right of the parents).
157. See id. at 1169.
158. See id. at 1166.
159. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (recognizing that the constitutionally protected right of pri-
vacy encompasses a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy).
160. See Irwin, 615 F.2d at 1168-69.
161. See Costello, supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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want to instill such values in their children. 162 The court's protec-
tion of a minor's decision to choose whether to obtain contracep-
tion diminishes the opportunity for parents to make arbitrary
decisions that may not be in their child's best interest.
Similarly, in Curtis v. School Committee,63 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts upheld a school sponsored program of con-
dom availability that lacked opt-out and parental notification pro-
visions. 164 The parents of students in the Falmouth public school
system challenged the program claiming that the absence of the
provisions violated their constitutional right to direct the upbring-
ing of their children as they deemed fit. 165 The court, however,
recognized that the inclusion of the provisions would arm parents
with the power to arbitrarily veto their child's decision to obtain
birth control. 166 As the Sixth Circuit noted in Irwin, the fact that
the program may offend the moral and religious sensibilities of par-
ents does not legitimatize infringement on their child's constitu-
tional zone of privacy.167 In upholding the program, the court
emphasized the importance of safeguarding a minor's right to
choose whether to obtain contraceptives. 68
In assessing whether children should have authority to consent
to strip searches in child abuse investigations, it is necessary to rec-
ognize that many state legislatures have also carved out exceptions
for situations in which parents do not act in the best interest of
their children. 69 By doing so, the legislatures recognize the impor-
tance of protecting a minor's health and well-being from the ill mo-
tives of their parents. In particular, many state legislatures have
created exceptions permitting minors to consent to the testing and
treatment of sexually transmitted diseases. 7 0  Minors often refuse
162. See id.
163. 420 Mass. 749 (1995) (holding that a program distributing condoms at junior
and senior high schools did not violate either the fundamental liberty interest of par-
ents to be free from unnecessary governmental intrusion in rearing of children or the
free exercise of religion).
164. See id. at 763.
165. See id. at 752.
166. See id. at 757.
167. See id.
168. See id.; Curtis v. School Committee, No. 92518, 1993 WL 818795, at *3 (Mass.
Super. Oct. 7, 1993) ("Among these privacy interests is a minor's right to make deci-
sions affecting procreation, including a right to access contraception." (citing Carey v.
Populations Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977))).
169. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-11A-19 (1975).
170. See id. Alabama's statute provides that:
[A] minor 12 years of age or older who may have come into contact with any
sexually transmitted disease as designated by the State Board of Health may
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give consent to the furnishing of medical care related to the diagnosis or
treatment of such disease, provided a duly licensed practitioner of medicine
in Alabama authorizes such diagnosis and treatment. The consent of the
minor shall be as valid and binding as if the minor had achieved his or her
majority. Such consent shall not be voidable nor subject to later disaffirm-
ance because of minority.
Id. California's statute states that:
[A] minor who is 12 years of age or older and who may have come into
contact with an infectious, contagious, or communicable disease may consent
to medical care related to the diagnosis or treatment of the disease, if the
disease or condition is one that is required by law or regulation adopted
pursuant to law to be reported to the local health officer, or is a related
sexually transmitted disease, as may be determined by the State Director of
Health Services.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926 (West 1992). "A minor who is 12 years of age or older and
who is alleged to have been raped may consent to medical care related to the diagno-
sis or treatment of the condition and the collection of medical evidence with regard to
the alleged rape." Id. § 6927. "A minor who is alleged to have been sexually as-
saulted may consent to medical care related to the diagnosis and treatment of the
condition, and the collection of medical evidence with regard to the alleged sexual
assault." Id. § 6928. Illinois's statute provides that "a minor 12 years of age or older
who may have come into contact with any sexually transmitted disease... may give
consent to the furnishing of medical care or counseling related to the diagnosis or
treatment of the disease." 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/4 (West 1961). Iowa's
statute states that a minor who has personally made an application for services,
screening, or treatment of a sexually transmitted disease may give written consent to
these procedures. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 141.22 (West 1988). "Such consent is not
subject to later disaffirmance by reason of minority." Id. Nevada's statute provides
that "the consent of the parent, parents or legal guardian of a minor is not necessary
in order to authorize a local or state health officer, licensed physician or clinic to
examine or treat, or both, any minor who is suspected of being infected or is found to
be infected with any sexually transmitted disease." NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.060 (1971).
New Hampshire's statute states that:
Any minor 14 years of age or older may voluntarily submit himself to medi-
cal diagnosis and treatment for a sexually transmitted disease and a licensed
physician may diagnose, treat or prescribe for the treatment of a sexually
transmitted disease in a minor 14 years of age or older, without the knowl-
edge or consent of the parent or legal guardian or such minor.
N.H. STAT. ANN. § 141-C:18 (1986). Ohio's statute provides that "a minor may give
consent for the diagnosis or treatment of any venereal disease by a licensed physician.
Such consent is not subject to disaffirmance because of minority. The consent of the
parent, parents, or guardian of a minor is not required for such diagnosis or treat-
ment." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241 (West 1971). Rhode Island's statute states
that "persons under 18 years of age may give legal consent for examination and treat-
ment for any sexually transmitted disease." R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-11-11 (1965). Wash-
ington's statute provides that:
A minor fourteen years of age or older who may have come in contact with
any sexually transmitted disease or suspected sexually transmitted disease
may give consent to the furnishing of hospital, medical and surgical care re-
lated to the diagnosis or treatment of such disease. Such consent shall not be
subject to disaffirmance because of the minority. The consent of the parent,
parents, or legal guardian of such minor shall not be necessary to authorize
hospital, medical and surgical care related to such disease.
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to inform their parents of medical needs arising from sexual activ-
ity.171 This unfortunate reality frequently stems from the fear that
parents will look shamefully upon their child's behavior. As a re-
sult, minors that choose not to tell their parents about a health
problem may fail to seek medical care if parental consent is
required. 172
Similar state statutes allow minors to obtain medical care with-
out parental consent or judicial authorization for drug or alcohol
related problems. 173 Because drug use and underage drinking are
both illegal and detrimental to one's health, minors who engage in
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.110 (West 1969). Wisconsin's statute provides that
"[a] physician may treat a minor infected with a sexually transmitted disease or ex-
amine and diagnose a minor for the presence of such a disease without obtaining the
consent of the minor's parents or guardian." WiS. STAT. ANN. § 252.11 (West 1975).
171. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Kramer, Adolescents, Abortions and Amendments:
Choices After American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 133,
142 (1998) (noting that the health of minors is best promoted by allowing minors to
obtain medical care that relates to sexual activity without parental consent because
minors have an aversion to discussing the medical consequences of their sexual activi-
ties with their parents); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797
(Cal. 1997) (noting that the California Legislature has enacted a series of statutes
authorizing minors, without parental consent, to obtain medical care related to the
diagnosis or treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, rape, and sexual assault). The
court in Lungren explains that these statutes demonstrate a
long-standing legislative recognition that (1) minors frequently are reluctant
to disclose to their parents medical needs arising out of the minor's involve-
ment in sexual activity and may postpone or avoid seeking such care if pa-
rental consent is required, and (2) as a consequence, the health of minors
generally will be protected best in this setting by authorizing minors to ob-
tain medical care relating to such activity without parental consent.
Id.; see also Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 119 (1973) (stating that jurisdictions, which have dropped
all age restrictions for consent to medical care related to drug use or early sexual
activity, are motivated by the fear that minors will forgo care if forced to consult with
parents in these situations).
172. See Jessica A. Penkower, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents To
Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Fatal Misuse of The Mature Minor Doctrine, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1206 (1996) ("[M]inor treatment statutes were enacted in re-
sponse to society's fear that minors would rather suffer from sexually transmitted dis-
eases, alcohol and substance abuse, and mental disorders than risk the consequences
of consulting their parents, who may be angry, accusative, or unsupportive.").
173. Illinois's statute provides that:
The consent of the parent, parents, or legal guardian of a minor shall not be
necessary to authorize medical care or counseling related to . . . drug use or
alcohol consumption by the minor .... The consent of the minor shall be
valid and binding as if the minor had achieved his or her majority. The con-
sent shall not be voidable nor subject to later disaffirmance because of
minority.
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/4 (West 1961). Indiana's statute states that "a minor
who voluntarily seeks treatment for alcoholism, alcohol abuse, or drug abuse... may
receive treatment without notification or consent of the parents, guardian, or person
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such activities are less likely to inform their parents of any need for
help. As a result, if the legislature requires parental consent for
having control or custody of the minor." IND. CODE ANN. § 12-23-12-1 (1992). Kan-
sas's statute states that a licensed physician may:
examine and treat such minor for drug abuse, misuse or addiction if such
physician has secured the prior consent of such minor to the examination
and treatment. All such examinations and treatment may be performed
without the consent of any parent, guardian or other person having custody
of such minor, and all minors are hereby granted the right to give consent to
such examination and treatment.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2892a (1971). Kentucky's statute provides that:
Any physician, upon consultation by a minor as a patient, with the consent
of such minor may make a diagnostic examination for ... alcohol or other
drug abuse or addiction and may advise, prescribe for, and treat such minor
regarding... alcohol and other drug abuse or addiction without the consent
of or notification to the parent, parents, or guardian of such minor patient,
or to any other person having custody of such minor patient.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185 (Banks-Baldwin 1988). Louisiana's statute provides
that:
Consent to the provision of medical or surgical care or services by a hospital
or public clinic, or to the performance of medical or surgical care or services
by a physician, licensed to practice medicine in this state, when executed by
a minor who is or believes himself to be addicted to a narcotic or other drug,
shall be valid and binding as if the minor had achieved his majority. Any
such consent shall not be subject to a later disaffirmance by reason of his
minority.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1096 (West 1972). Nevada's statute states that:
Any minor who is under the influence of, or suspected of being under the
influence of, a controlled substance may give express consent ...to the
furnishing of hospital, medical, surgical or other care for the treatment of
abuse of drugs or related illnesses ... and the consent of the minor is not
subject to disaffirmance because of minority.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.050 (1971). The New Jersey statute provides that:
When a minor believes that he is suffering from the use of drugs or is a drug
dependent person ... his consent to treatment ... shall be binding as if the
minor had achieved his or her own majority. Any such consent shall not be
subject to later disaffirmance by reason of minority.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4 (West 1975). North Dakota's statute provides that "[a]ny
person of the age of fourteen years or older may contract for and receive examina-
tion, care, or treatment for ... alcoholism or drug abuse without permission, author-
ity, or consent of a parent or guardian." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-17 (1971).
Pennsylvania's statute states that:
a minor who suffers from the use of a controlled or harmful substance may
give consent to furnishing of medical care or counseling related to diagnosis
or treatment. The consent of the parents or legal guardian of the minor shall
not be deemed necessary to authorize medical care or counseling related to
such diagnosis or treatment. The consent of the minor shall be valid and
binding as if the minor had achieved his majority. Such consent shall not be
voidable nor subject to later disaffirmance because of his minority.
71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1690.112 (West 1972). Wisconsin's statute provides that "a
physician or health care facility may release outpatient or detoxification services in-
formation only with the consent of the minor patient, provided that the minor is 12
years of age or over." WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.47 (West 1979).
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drug and alcohol abuse treatment, a minor who refuses to inform
his parents of his medical needs may threaten his own health and
safety. 74
With regard to child abuse and neglect, courts also have adjusted
the law to protect the health and well-being of children where par-
ents' actions and motives might be suspect.175 The Supreme Court
has held that a state official must investigate reports of child abuse
or neglect and remove the child from the home against the wishes
of the parents if the State finds that the child is in danger. 176 This
State usurpation of parental prerogative illustrates the State's con-
cern that parents may not be acting in the child's best interest.177
Furthermore, it indicates that in abusive situations the State must
retain a certain degree of authority to ensure the safety of the
children. 17 8
B. Exigent Circumstances and the Emergency Doctrine
Where a State actor has not obtained a warrant or consent, he
can conduct a warrantless search if exigent circumstances exist. 179
174. See Penkower, supra note 172 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that a state
may terminate parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that the
child is permanently neglected).
176. See id.
177. See Multnomah County Violence Prevention Community Resource Directory
(visited Feb. 3, 2000) <http://www.multnomah.lib.or.us/health/opd/violprev/manual/
child.html> (noting that in the context of child abuse there exists the strong likelihood
that the parent is the abuser). The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
compiled information from over forty states for 1990 and 1991, finding that of 514,665
cases reported, 79.9% (1990) and 80.1% (1991) of the alleged abusers were parents.
See THE CHILD WELFARE STAT BOOK 1993, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA
64-65 (1993); see also Steven F. Shatz, The Strip Search of Children and The Fourth
Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 33 (1991) ("[I]t is often a parent or guardian who is
suspected of the abuse.").
178. See, e.g., White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815-17 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that where a parent refused to admit police to his residence to investigate a child
abuse report, became violent and abusive, and instructed his son, who was about to
turn around to show policemen his back, to leave the room, police could reasonably
conclude that the parent might abuse the child again or flee with him if the police left
to get a court order).
179. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that police of-
ficers' entry into a private home in pursuit of a robbery suspect who had been seen
entering the home was justified by the need to protect the home's occupants); see also
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). The Court noted:
We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situa-
tions. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth
Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries
and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of
immediate aid.
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In the context of child abuse investigations, a State actor may enter
a child's home and search the child's body for evidence of child
abuse if he has "reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate
jeopardy and that the intrusion is reasonably necessary to alleviate
the threat.' 8 In Mincey v. Arizona, 8' the Supreme Court estab-
lished the emergency doctrine holding that the Fourth Amendment
did not bar against "warrantless entries or searches when . . . a
person ... is in need of immediate aid."'1 8 2 The Court explained
that obtaining a warrant can require an extended amount of time,
time that a person in danger cannot spare.183 Most warrantless en-
tries and searches in the context of child abuse investigations are
conducted in accordance with the emergency doctrine. 84
Id. "The right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency.., is inherent in
the very nature of their duties as peace officers, and derives from the common law."
Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d
Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)); see also
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Burger, J., concurring)
("The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what
would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."). "Unlike cases involv-
ing other 'exigent circumstances' exceptions, these cases do not require probable
cause to believe a person is subject to arrest or that the tools, fruits or evidence of a
crime will be found on the premises to be searched." Good, 891 F.2d at 1093 (citing
United States v. Booth, 455 A.2d 1351, 1354 (D.C. App. 1983)).
180. Good, 891 F.2d at 1094 (citing People v. Smith, 7 Cal.3d 282, 286 (1972)). The
court in Good, however, emphasized that "the exception must not be permitted to
swallow the rule: in the absence of a showing of true necessity - that is, an imminent
and substantial threat to life, health, or property - the constitutionally guaranteed
right to privacy must prevail." Id.; see also Mark Hardin, Legal Barriers in Child
Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REv. 493, 508
(1988) ("Where a child is in imminent danger within a residence, the emergency doc-
trine may justify a warrantless entry and rescue of the child.").
181. 437 U.S. at 385.
182. Id. at 392.
183. See id.
184. See Laure Ashley Culbertson, Article 613 of the Louisiana Children's Code:
Child Abuse Investigations in the Twilight of the Fourth Amendment, 55 LA. L. REV.
361 (1994). See, e.g., Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
visual inspection that occurred four months after the initial report of child abuse did
not constitute exigent circumstances); State v. Bittner, 359 N.W.2d 121 (S.D. 1984)
(holding that emergency doctrine justified the warrantless search of a residence where
defendant was lawfully arrested and police received report of a baby in the home);
State v. Boggess, 115 Wis.2d 443 (1983) (holding that exigent circumstances existed
where an anonymous caller provided detailed information regarding the existence of
child abuse and a potential emergency situation); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the emergency doctrine permitted a policeman to
enter the residence to protect a child and secure medical attention after receiving
report of a 13-month-old baby being shaken and struck and observing the child's life-
less condition); Nelson v. State, 609 P.2d 717 (Nev. 1980) (holding that where a
mother was arrested without probable cause, entry to protect unattended three-year-
old was not permitted by the emergency doctrine because police created the emer-
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A relevant issue left unresolved regarding searches that fall
within the emergency exception is the evidentiary standard applica-
ble to these searches. 185 Generally, an officer must have probable
cause to believe he will discover evidence before conducting a rea-
sonable search. 186 Courts have indicated, however, that probable
cause may not be the appropriate standard to measure the reasona-
bleness of a search in the context of child abuse investigations.' 87
Instead, some courts assert that an officer needs only a reasonable
suspicion that a child is in danger of death or serious injury.188
gency situation); State v. Jones, 45 Or. App. 617 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that exigent
circumstances existed where, after receiving an anonymous call that infants and small
child had been left alone, police observed the children crying at home with no adult
present); State v. Frink, 42 Or. App. 171 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the emergency
doctrine justified a warrantless search where the police received an anonymous tip
that a child was being injected with drugs and, upon approaching apartment, observed
drugs in plain view); In re C.E., 283 N.W.2d 554 (S.D. 1979) (holding that the emer-
gency doctrine justified a warrantless search of a home for the protection of the child
where state agency had previously removed the children from their home for mal-
treatment and 11 days after their return received a report of disturbance and discov-
ered the parents intoxicated on the porch and the child screaming inside); People v.
Draper, 196 Colo. 450 (1978) (holding that the emergency doctrine did not permit
warrantless search of home in response to a call for emergency assistance where, upon
arrival, baby was already dead); In re Dawn 0. 58 Cal. App. 3d 160 (1976) (holding
that exigent circumstances existed where a five-year-old informed a policeman that
her younger sister was alone in the home); People v. Sutton, 65 Cal. App.3d 341
(1976) (holding that the emergency doctrine permitted a warrantless entry where the
police received a report concerning an unattended child, observed an intoxicated wo-
man enter the home, and saw, in plain view, trash and dirty clothing in the apart-
ment); J.D. v. State, 558 P.2d 402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (holding the emergency
doctrine inapplicable where true motive of search was not to protect the child but to
uncover evidence of possible truancy); People v. Smith, 7 Cal.3d 282 (1972) (holding
that no true emergency existed where a neighbor had taken in a crying child and
called the police one hour later).
185. See Hardin, supra note 180, at 513.
186. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Some authorities believe that probable cause
should also apply in emergency situations. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.6(f), at 272-73; see also Sutton, 65 Cal. App. 3d at 341 (applying the
probable cause standard to a warrantless search in an emergency situation).
187. See, e.g., Jones, 45 Or. App. at 617 (rejecting the application of the probable
cause standard in emergency situations); see also Culbertson, supra note 184, at 380.
The Supreme Court has abandoned the probable cause requirement in certain emer-
gency situations. See Culbertson, supra note 184, at 380 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968)). Culbertson contends that the Court's willingness to adopt the reasonable
suspicion standard where exigent circumstances exist supports the proposition that
reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard in child abuse investigations. See id.
Entry into the home during a child abuse investigation should be permitted when the
officer "has a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
worker's belief the child in the premises has been abused or neglected." Id.
188. See Jones, 45 Or. App. at 617.
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Courts have defined reasonable suspicion as "a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity. ' 189 A mere subjective belief will not suffice. 190 In
contrast, the Supreme Court has defined probable cause as a "flexi-
ble, common sense standard" requiring only a "practical, nontech-
nical probability that incriminating evidence is involved." 191
Although the probable cause standard is not easily reduced into a
clear rule of law, it at least requires the probability that evidence of
child abuse exists.' 92
In determining whether a probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion standard should apply to searches in child abuse investiga-
tions, it is necessary for one to understand the practical differences
189. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981); see also Metcalf v. Long,
615 F. Supp. 1108, 1115 (D. Del. 1985) (noting that "[i]n the final analysis, it is the
totality of circumstances confronting the officers at the time that presents the objec-
tive basis for determining whether there was a basis for reasonable suspicion").
190. See Long, 615 F. Supp. at 1115; see also In re Hector R., 695 N.Y.S.2d 359
(1999) (holding that a school official's reasonable suspicion that juvenile had gun in
his possession was sufficient to justify search of juvenile's bag taking into account and
balancing juvenile's legitimate expectations of privacy and school's need to protect its
students against violence); People v. Coleman, 626 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1995) (affirming the
lower court's holding denying the suppression of a gun recovered by police during
search of defendant's "knap-sac" since it was discovered in a lawful search of the
defendant conducted with reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed).
191. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). The probable cause standard
requires:
that the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief," that certain items may be contraband or stolen prop-
erty or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that
such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.
Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). See also People v. Pot-
ter, 697 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1999) (holding that a trooper had probable cause to arrest the
defendant, impound his vehicle, and conduct an inventory search of vehicle, where
the vehicle had no front license plate, the rear license plate was covered by snow, the
license plates had been reported lost or stolen, and the defendant's license had been
revoked); People v. Park, 697 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1999) (concluding that probable cause
existed to issue a search warrant for the upper and lower apartments of the defend-
ant's residence where an informant testified that he had purchased marijuana from
the defendant's apartment over course of 18 years and had seen a marijuana plant in
the defendant's second-floor apartment, and the recent electricity bill for the unoccu-
pied second-floor apartment showed double electric consumption of occupied lower
apartment); People v. Morla, 699 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1999) (ruling that confidential in-
formant involved in underlying drug transactions, electronic monitoring of drug trans-
actions by police officer affiant, application that the defendant was in possession of
suspected cocaine immediately after leaving premises on three occasions and that the
defendant was in control of premises gave officer probable cause to search premises
for cocaine, drug paraphernalia, records and items demonstrating ownership of the
premises).
192. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. "The process does not deal with hard certainties,
but with probabilities." Id.
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between the two standards. Although a strip search is highly intru-
sive upon the privacy of the child and his family, the potential con-
sequences of failing to intervene may be grave. 193 If the law
requires officers to meet a more demanding evidentiary standard,
the possibility remains that the officer will fail to meet these re-
quirements in situations where death or severe and permanent
physical injury might occur.194 Moreover, often child abuse is pres-
ent but does not threaten physical injuries severe enough to create
probable cause for intervention.195 In these situations, while em-
ploying the stricter standard may avoid interventions based on un-
substantiated reports of child abuse, it may also produce an
increased likelihood that actual cases of child abuse remain
undetected. 96
C. The Qualified Immunity Defense: Distinguishing between
Police Officers and Social Workers
Because warrantless strip searches of children in child abuse in-
vestigations implicate Fourth Amendment concerns, in determin-
ing the appropriate rule, it is necessary for one to decide how the
law should treat police officers and social workers when they are
accused of conducting a search in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. To reach this conclusion, one must first take into account
the qualified immunity defense as applied to these State officials in
the context of child abuse investigations.
The doctrine of qualified immunity absolves a State actor of lia-
bility where the court finds that neither constitutional nor statutory
law clearly prohibits the search.197 In Franz v. Lytle,198 the Tenth
193. See Hardin, supra note 180, at 513; see also Gifford, supra note 107, at 1027
("[S]ocial workers are forced to make difficult decisions which could result in either a
violation of parental rights should they decide to intercede, or substantial harm or
even death to children should they instead decide not to interfere with the parent-
child relationship."); State v. Bittner, 359 N.W.2d 121, 127 (S.D. 1984) (noting that if
police officers had failed to search the home, an unattended infant child may have
been seriously harmed); State v. Boggess, 340 N.W.2d 516, 524 (Wis. 1983) (holding
that warrantless entry into home was necessary to protect children from serious injury
or death).
194. See Hardin, supra note 180, at 513.
195. See Culbertson, supra note 184, at 366. "[A]buse and neglect too often go
undetected until they become 'serious' or fatal. A procedure that allows an effective
investigation when abuse is indicated by evidence that does not yet rise to the level of
probable cause is very desirable." Id.
196. See id.
197. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635 (1987) (holding that qualified immunity was available as a defense where at the
time the defendants acted, it was not clearly established law that a child abuse investi-
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Circuit reviewed the current state of the law regarding warrantless
searches in child abuse investigations and the applicability of the
qualified immunity defense. 99 In Franz, parents and their child
brought suit against a police officer and social worker for con-
ducting a warrantless search of the child during a child abuse inves-
tigation.20 0 The officer moved for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. 201 He argued that the administrative exception
for social workers in child abuse investigations should also apply to
police officers.202
In rejecting the officer's contention,0 3 the court in Franz held
that the qualified immunity defense applied to social workers but
gation conducted by police officers was subject to the probable cause or warrant re-
quirements). Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in
damages actions if their conduct did not violate clearly established rights. See Ander-
son, 483 U.S. at 640. In Anderson, the Supreme Court defined "clearly established"
as follows:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very ac-
tion in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in
light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. (citations omitted).
198. 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a child's rash and urine soaked
diaper did not justify a police officers' warrantless search of the home, inspection of
child's vaginal area and forcible removal of child for medical examination during child
abuse and neglect investigation).
199. See id. at 793 (holding that the more liberal standard of probable cause for
social workers did not apply to police officer investigating criminal sexual abuse).
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. Prior to Franz, the state of the law regarding the warrant requirement
in child abuse investigations was unclear. See Patrick E. O'Neill, Time for Direction:
The Need for a Clear, Uniform Rule Regarding Searches During Child Abuse Investi-
gations, 83 Ky. L.J. 529, 541 (1995). Courts were willing to allow the administrative
exception to the warrant requirement in a child abuse investigation if a satisfactory
regulatory scheme was in place; however, administrative schemes were rarely in place,
and thus the administrative exception was not applied often. See id. In Darryl H. v.
Coler, the Seventh Circuit held that the administrative scheme in place was not suffi-
cient to ensure a reasonable search. See 801 F.2d 893, 904 (7th Cir. 1986). Recogniz-
ing the uncertainty in the state of the law, however, the court decided that the
D.C.F.S. was entitled to qualified immunity. See O'Neill, supra, at 541. In contrast, in
Wildberger v. State, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland said that the statutory
scheme, requiring child abuse investigators to determine the condition of any other
child in the household when a case of abuse is suspected, satisfied the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement of reasonableness. See 536 A.2d 718, 723 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988). It is unclear why the courts in Darryl H. and Wildberger reached different
conclusions on the constitutionality of the searches in each case. See O'Neill, supra, at
541.
203. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 788. The court in Franz stated:
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not police officers.20 4 It reasoned that the officer was trained to
know the probable cause and warrant requirements and, thus,
should have known that the search was illegal.20 5 As a result, the
court concluded that the officer's search did not fall within one of
the recognized exceptions. 0 6 The court explained that the police
officer was conducting a criminal investigation in search of evi-
dence of abuse by one or more of the parents.20 7 It held that this
conduct was "circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment which
'clearly prohibited police officers from conducting warrantless
searches of a home and a child's body for evidence of criminal sex-
ual abuse absent consent or exigent circumstances or any of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.' "208 In con-
trast, a social worker is not trained to know the subtleties of the
probable cause and warrant requirements and, thus, would "have
no such fluency of the legal standards. 2 0 9 Therefore, the court
found that only the social worker was entitled to qualified
immunity. 1 0
Proponents of the qualified immunity defense contend that to
best protect the health and well-being of children, social workers'
[i]n crafting a separate analysis for deciding the legality of administrative
searches based on "the longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor
probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance," the
Court has developed a balancing test. "[O]ur cases establish that where a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context."
Id. at 788 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665
(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-24 (1989)).
204. See id. at 793 ("Deciding that police officers, functioning as police officers,
must conduct themselves by the constitutional norms that embrace their training,
should not deter their concern for the well-being of children and families, but
heighten their awareness of their proper role within these boundaries."). The court in
Franz stated that it must:
decide to sustain a claim of the lawful exercise of authority based on quali-
fied immunity if, upon examining the information defendant possessed, [it]
can conclude a reasonable officer in the same position in 1988, schooled in
the governing principles of the Fourth Amendment, believed he was acting
in accord with those principles.
Id. at 787.
205. See id. at 788.
206. See id.
207. See id.
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investigations must not be hindered by undue restrictions.2 1
Courts that adhere to this viewpoint explain that the public's inter-
est in preventing child abuse can only be served if social workers
are afforded latitude in making decisions regarding the safety of
children in abusive situations. 212
Furthermore, supporters of the qualified immunity defense note
that it balances the child's right to be free from physical abuse
against the fundamental right of the family to remain intact and
free from unwarranted government intrusion.213 Courts that grant
qualified immunity explain that judicial review is necessary to pre-
vent social workers' unwarranted intrusions into the family's zone
of privacy. 14 While the law in these situations treats the untrained
leniently, it is also careful to ensure that social workers do not
abuse this privilege.21 5 Thus, proponents of the qualified immunity
defense argue that it strikes an equitable balance between the con-
flicting interests of protecting the private citizens and ensuring that
agency officials function effectively.216
211. See Gifford, supra note 107, at 1021. "For social workers, the potential expo-
sure to 'large damage awards for the consequences of their decisions will serve to chill
the exercise of their professional judgment in determining how to respond most effec-
tively to cases of suspected abuse."' Id. at 1030 (quoting Timothy J. Courville, Note,
Government Liability for Failure to Prevent Child Abuse: A Rationale for Absolute
Immunity, 27 B.C.L. REV. 949, 985 (1986)); see also Jack M. Beermann, A Critical
Approach to Section 1983 With Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV.
51, 83 (1989) ("[T]he more damages liability an official is threatened with, the greater
the tendency toward timidity.").
212. See Gifford, supra note 107, at 1021; see also Whelehan v. County of Monroe,
558 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (recognizing the "great importance of the
child-protective function" of social workers and the "detriment to society" if social
workers were subjected to liability under § 1983).
213. See Gifford, supra note 107, at 1021.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. "A number of other federal circuits have followed this approach, hold-
ing that the defense of qualified or good faith immunity achieves a more desirable
balance between parental rights and the interest in protecting children from abuse."
Id. at 1021; see also Fittanto v. Klein, 788 F. Supp. 1451, 1458 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding
that because the "law concerning child abuse ... is no clearer today than it was in
1984 and 1985" the social workers were entitled to qualified immunity); Weller v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 398 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding a social worker
entitled to qualified immunity as long as conduct did not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would know); Baker v. Ra-
cansky, 887 F.2d 183, 190 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that social workers' conduct in
removing children from parents suspected of abusing them did not violate clearly es-
tablished law, thus entitling the workers to qualified immunity); Achterhof v. Selvag-
gio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that social workers' investigatory or
administrative decisions are entitled to qualified immunity).
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In determining whether a uniform law should be established, the
court in Franz also considered the practical differences between
searches by police officers and searches by social workers.217 On
one hand, during a child abuse investigation, a police officer fo-
cuses on the presence of potential criminal activity.218 Moreover, a
police officer often conducts a search clothed in his uniform and
carrying a gun.219 In contrast, a social worker investigating alleged
incidents of child abuse focuses on the safety and well-being of the
child.22° In addition, a social worker is dressed in plain clothes and
is trained to deal with families in crisis situations.221
In light of the potential psychological and emotional trauma
caused by strip searches in child abuse investigations, 222 it is crucial
to consider these distinctions when formulating the appropriate
standard. When a police officer, dressed in uniform and armed,
approaches a child in the privacy of the child's own home and asks
him to remove his clothing, the child may become frightened and
embarrassed. 23 The officer's intimidating presence may suggest to
the child that he has done something wrong.2 24
217. See Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1983).
218. See id. ("[D]efendant's focus was not so much on the child as it was on the
potential criminal culpability of her parents. That focus is the hallmark of a criminal
investigation."); see also Interagency Council of the Maricopa County Children's Jus-
tice Project, Multidisciplinary Protocol for the Investigation of Child Abuse 1 (July
1999) (on file with the Scottsdale, Ariz. Police Department) ("The purpose of law
enforcement's response to incidents of physical and sexual abuse involving children is
to determine if a crime has been committed and to bring to light those facts and
circumstances necessary to bring the perpetrators into the Criminal Justice System.")
[hereinafter "Multidisciplinary Protocol"].
219. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 791.
220. See id. ("[A] social worker's principal focus is the welfare of the child."); see
also Family-Centered Child Protective Services, Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec.: Admin. of
Children, Youth, and Families, Social Workers' Training Manual (Dec. 1995) (on file
with Ariz. Admin. of Children, Youth, and Families) [hereinafter "Family-Centered
Child Protective Services"].
Child welfare values, philosophy, and law are ultimately guided by the best
interest of the child and this may at times require that parental rights be
compromised, when that is the only way to meet the best interest of the
child. [W]hen the child cannot be protected without restricting parental
rights, in spite of all attempts to do so, we are always legally and ethically
mandated to protect children.
Family-Centered Child Protective Services, supra, at 28.
221. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 791.
222. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
223. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 791.
224. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 635 F.2d 582, 583 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The accusing
finger of the police may well remain for a lifetime upon these young, impressionable
minds."); see also Dave Mann, E. Dundee Police Fish for Closer Kid Ties, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, August 13, 1999, at 1 ("A police officer - standing tall in a dark blue uni-
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On the other hand, social workers are trained in dealing with
domestic issues.225 They deal regularly with abusive situations and
are accustomed to conducting non-criminal investigations for evi-
dence of child abuse.226 When a social worker approaches a child
in his home to conduct a strip search for evidence of child abuse,
his presence will most likely not create the same troubling reaction
by the child as that of the police officer.227 In addition, because the
social worker is not conducting a criminal investigation, it would be
unreasonable to expect him to be aware of subtleties of the warrant
and probable cause requirements and conduct his search
accordingly.228
In determining whether a uniform law should be established, it is
necessary to consider the difference between training protocol for
police officers and social workers. Training protocol for police of-
ficers ensures that the officers are fluent in the subtleties of the
Fourth Amendment. 229 For example, the Multidisciplinary Proto-
col for the Investigation of Child Abuse, used in training police
officers in Maricopa County, Arizona, requires that the officers be
well-versed in the relevant legal standards and conduct their
searches accordingly.230 By instructing the police officers to assess
the need for a search warrant on the second page of its over 200
page manual, this district emphasizes the importance of complying
with the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement when investi-
gating abusive situations.231
form, a pistol and nightstick hanging from a black leather belt - can be an imposing
figure to a child."); Bay Area Datelines, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, May 17, 1999, at
4 ("A lot of times, children get scared when they see the guns and the blue uniform
and all that stuff.").
225. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 791.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 831 (D. Kan. 1983). Because neither
courts nor Congress have established a uniform rule specifying situations in which a
social worker can conduct a constitutional strip search of a child in abuse investiga-
tions, there is no mandate to educate social workers in order to remedy the "have no
such fluency of the legal standards," as represented by the Fourth Amendment or by
"clearly established" fundamental rights. Michael Compitello, Note and Comment,
Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in the Battle Against Child
Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, 183 (1997).
229. See, e.g., Multidisciplinary Protocol, supra note 218.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 2. The manual requires that, after a police officer determines that a
crime has been committed, the officer must "[a]ssess the need for a search warrant. If
a search warrant is needed, immediately contact a Detective. Investigators should
contact the County Attorney's Office in regards to sealing the affidavit of the search
warrant." Id. (emphasis added).
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By contrast, training protocol for social workers does not typi-
cally mandate learning the warrant or probable cause requirements
of the Fourth Amendment.232 For example, the Arizona Adminis-
tration of Children, Youth, and Families ("ACYF"), responsible for
training Arizona's one thousand social workers in child abuse in-
vestigative procedures, does not dedicate any of its twenty-three
day training seminar to teaching the constitutional requirements of
conducting a search during a child abuse investigation.233 In the
ACYF's 275 page training manual, there is no mention of the
Fourth Amendment, the warrant requirement, or the probable
cause standard. 34
Recognizing the distinction between police officers and social
workers, state courts have granted qualified immunity to social
workers in child abuse investigations.235 In Chayo v. Kaladjian,236
the Southern District of New York afforded qualified immunity to
social workers where they believed that allegations of abuse were
serious enough to waive the consent and warrant requirements.237
The court reasoned that "if [social workers] err in interrupting pa-
rental custody, they may be accused of infringing the parents' con-
stitutional rights. If they err in not removing the child, they risk
injury to the child. ' 238 The court further explained that, for this
reason, caseworkers need not "believe" the abuse is ongoing and
the danger is imminent, but rather, be presented with evidence of
abuse and "have reason to fear" that danger is imminent. 39
232. See, e.g., Family-Centered Child Protective Services, supra note 220.
233. See id. The ACYF's supplement to the training manual states "[iln responding
to reports of abuse and neglect, the department shall respect the legal rights of the
parents, guardians or custodians while ensuring the safety of the child." See Chapter
5: Investigation and Assessment- Responding to Reports of Abuse and Neglect. This
sentence is the extent to which the ACYF expresses its concern with constitutional
mandates. See id. No further explanation or instruction is provided. See id.
234. See supra note 220.
235. See, e.g., Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1983). The distinction
between the roles of a social worker and a police officer during a child abuse investi-
gation justified a policy providing for a less stringent requirement of probable cause in
those searches performed by Social Services. See id. The Franz court also pointed
out that a warrant or probable cause requirement imposed on a social worker would
hinder his ability to effectively investigate. See Compitello, supra note 228, at 173.
236. 844 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that caseworkers who received a
report of suspected child abuse acted reasonably in removing children from their par-
ents' home and taking them to the hospital for medical examination and were entitled
to qualified immunity).
237. See id.
238. Id. at 168 (quoting Van Emrik v. Chenung County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 911
F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1990)).
239. Id.
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In addition to the courts, numerous state legislatures have en-
acted statutes that confer various forms of immunity upon social
workers in child abuse investigations. 240 These statutes illustrate
the States' concern that "[t]he threat of potential liability will likely
deter child protection workers from exercising their best profes-
sional judgment in child abuse investigations. 2 41 Where a social
worker's actions coincide with those actions protected under the
specific statute, the social worker may enjoy whatever level of im-
munity the statute confers. While these state statutes only protect
against liability for reporting child abuse, their underlying rationale
echoes that of the courts in granting qualified immunity to social
workers for conducting a search of a child in violation of the par-
ents' constitutional rights.242
III. RELAXING THE RULE
A. Children Should Possess the Authority to Consent to
Entrance and Strip Searches in Child Abuse Investigations
Children should be afforded the right to consent to the entrance
into the home and search by State officials of their body for evi-
dence of child abuse. If courts permit parents to veto the child's
consent, a troubling scenario arises. In most situations where child
abuse is present in the home, the abuser is a parent. 43 A parent
who is guilty of abusing his or her own child will usually not will-
ingly permit a police officer or social worker to enter the home and
search the child's body for evidence of abuse.244 To evade discov-
ery of his or her involvement in the abusive situation, the parent
will likely refuse consent.
The fact that parents' actions are often inconsistent with their
children's best interest 245 heightens the State's concern in affirma-
tively safeguarding children from harm. The State cannot effec-
tively ensure the safety and welfare of its children if the violators of
the children are permitted to shield them from the protections of
the State and the law. It is unrealistic and problematic to believe
that the State's interest in protecting its minor citizens will be best
240. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-9 (1999) (providing absolute immunity for per-
sons involved in the reporting of suspected child abuse); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172
(West 2000) (granting immunity for persons involved in reporting suspected child
abuse).
241. Courville, supra note 211, at 951.
242. See, e.g., supra notes 236-239 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 177.
244. See supra note 178.
245. See, e.g., supra notes 152, 177.
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served by entrusting parents with the authority to consent to these
searches.246 In Danforth and Santosky, the Supreme Court illus-
trated its willingness to remove authority from the hands of the
parents in situations where the parents are not acting in the child's
best interest.247 Thus, in child abuse investigations, to ensure that
parents are not refusing to allow a strip search of their child for
suspect reasons, the child should retain the authority to consent to
the search.
Courts' willingness to allow children to consent to medical treat-
ment where their parents' motives might be suspect 248 provides fur-
ther support for the contention that children should have a right to
consent to entrance into the home and a strip search of their body
for evidence of abuse. In addition, the many state statutes that re-
flect the need to protect children from their parents' arbitrary deci-
sions249 provide an even stronger basis to argue that children
should be allowed to consent in these special situations. The fact
that courts and state legislatures afford children the right to con-
sent to medical procedures such as abortion and the treatment of
sexually transmitted diseases25 ° lends weight to the studies that in-
dicate minors of a certain age are capable of making rational, ma-
ture decisions with almost the same degree of competency as
adults. Furthermore, courts' adoption of the mature minor doc-
trine illustrates the courts' recognition that, in certain situations,
minors can make independent and responsible decisions. A similar
rationale lies at the core of allowing children to consent in child
abuse investigations.
B. The Evidentiary Standard for the Exigent Circumstances
Exception Should Be Lowered to Reasonable Suspicion
The evidentiary requirement for conducting strip searches in
child abuse investigations under the exigent circumstances excep-
tion should be lowered to reasonable suspicion. The potential con-
246. See, e.g., supra notes 152, 177.
247. In Danforth, the Supreme Court recognized that the constitutionally protected
right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy.
See 428 U.S. 52, 60 (1976). In Santosky, the parents of three children appealed a
family court ruling that their children were permanently neglected. See 455 U.S. 745,
752 (1982). The family court ordered that the children be removed from the home
and placed in foster care. See id. The Supreme Court ruled that a state may termi-
nate parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child is
permanently neglected. See id. at 769.
248. See supra notes 149-168 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 170, 173.
250. See supra notes 149-168, 170, 173.
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sequences of failing to intervene in an abusive situation outweigh
the ramifications of infringing on the privacy rights of the child and
his family."' Requiring social workers and police officers to com-
ply with a probable cause standard would create the possibility that
State actors will fail to meet this requirement in situations where
risk of death or severe and permanent physical injury exists. 2
Moreover, in some instances, strict adherence to a probable cause
standard will paralyze State officials' efforts to investigate allega-
tions of child abuse.253 Permitting social workers and police of-
ficers to conduct warrantless searches in child abuse investigations
where there exists a reasonable suspicion that child abuse is pres-
ent will allow them to perform their professional duties free from
fear that they have not complied with the high evidentiary standard
of probable cause.
In addition, where child abuse is present but does not threaten
physical injuries severe enough to require intervention under a
probable cause standard, a reasonable suspicion requirement will
prevent less severe cases of abuse from being unattended.254
Although employing the stricter standard may avoid interventions
based on unsubstantiated reports of child abuse, it also will pro-
duce an increased likelihood that actual cases of child abuse re-
main undetected.255
Furthermore, social workers and police officers should have au-
thority to conduct a strip search where they suspect the child has
been harmed even if the harm is not of the magnitude that will
endanger the child. Physical abuse, however slight, can potentially
cause grave emotional and psychological trauma. 6 Where parents
are not ensuring the safety of their children, it is the State's respon-
sibility to ensure that children are not subject to such abuse.257 By
lowering the threshold of suspicion, courts would provide children
in danger with greater protection from harm.
C. Qualified Immunity Defense: Available to Social Workers
But Not to Police Officers
In the context of child abuse investigations, courts should recog-
nize a rebuttable presumption that the qualified immunity defense
251. See supra note 193.
252. See supra note 194.
253. See supra note 195.
254. See supra notes 195-196.
255. See supra note 196.
256. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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is available to social workers, but not police officers.258 First, the
practical differences between a search by a social worker and a
search by a police officer indicate that the presence of a police of-
ficer will increase the likelihood and magnify the severity of
trauma to the child.2 19 A police officer in uniform and armed with
a weapon will likely cause the child to be embarrassed and intimi-
dated, convinced that he has done something wrong.2 60 In contrast,
the presence of a social worker will most likely not produce the
same troubling result. Social workers are dressed in plain clothes
and their appearance is less likely to create an uncomfortable envi-
ronment for the child.2 6 1
Moreover, the differences in training protocol for social workers
and police officers regarding child abuse investigations are signifi-
cant and support the proposition that they be afforded different
levels of immunity. Social workers are trained in carefully dealing
with the sensitive issues that accompany abusive situations. 262 Be-
cause becoming familiar with the subtleties of the Fourth Amend-
ment is beyond the scope of social workers' training,2 63 it is
unreasonable to expect them to satisfy the warrant and probable
cause requirements when conducting searches during child abuse
investigations. To protect the welfare of children in abusive situa-
tions, social workers must be able to use their best professional
judgment in determining when and to what extent to intervene.
Their efforts to investigate child abuse must not be unduly re-
stricted.264 While the qualified immunity defense will retain the ju-
dicial review necessary to prevent social workers' unwarranted
intrusions into the family's zone of privacy, it also will ensure that
these State actors are able to perform their job unhindered by fears
of prosecution.
258. This Note does not propose a bright line rule making the qualified immunity
defense only available to social workers. Instead, this Note suggests the formulation
of a rebuttable presumption that the qualified immunity defense is available to social
workers, but not police officers. In unique situations where a social worker is well-
trained in the warrant or probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, or
wears a police-like uniform, courts should consider these factors in determining
whether to subject these State actors to liability. Similarly, if a police officer is
dressed in plain clothes and conducts a non-criminal investigation that focuses primar-
ily on the child's welfare, courts should account for these factors in assessing the avail-
ability of the qualified immunity defense.
259. See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 221, 225 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 228, 232-228 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 211.
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On the other hand, police officers are well-trained in the legal
standards of the Fourth Amendment 65 and should be expected
and required to comply with them. Furthermore, since their chief
interest lies with the capture and prosecution of criminal offend-
ers,266 and not with the well-being of children, officers need not be
afforded the same latitude as social workers in determining when it
is appropriate to intervene in an abusive situation. Because the
urgency of a child abuse investigation centers on the safety of the
child, not on the investigation of a crime, only those officials with
primary concern for the child should be shielded from liability.
CONCLUSION
Although increasing incidents of child abuse make clear the des-
perate need for legal reform, courts and state legislatures have yet
to develop uniform rules of law that adequately safeguard the
health and well-being of children in abusive situations. By relaxing
the current standards governing strip searches in child abuse inves-
tigations and affording children a voice in these situations, the law
will reflect a significant advance toward keeping children from
harm.
265. See supra notes 229-231 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 218.
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